|Corda Network trust root||Document history|
Trust Root Generation
The generation of the long-lived trust root for Corda Network required a level of ceremony, witnessing and memorialisation that was met through a highly-scripted and secure event held at the R3 offices at 2 London Wall, London, UK on Friday 14th September 2018. The ceremony required extensive preparation, advice and guidance from both KPMG in 2017 and Schellman in 2018, and included 7 independent witnesses from global banks and R3’s partner program. The total expenditure was more than one year of effort, and significant financial cost, in order to deliver long-term trust.
The full script for the event and other supporting artifacts are found via the links and attachments below.
The root key material generated is held in offline secure locations, and the subordinate key material held on production HSMs.
Current version is v12 - this should be updated to “issue” before network launch.
Certification Practices Statement
Current version is v09 - this should be updated to “issue” before network launch.
The certificate bundle (in JKS format) is the most likely to be used. The remaining details and formats are included for reference and to harmonise with other Certificate Authorities.
|Name||Public Key||Fingerprint||Valid Until||Links|
|Corda Network Root Certificate||ECC-256, SHA-256||44:30:BE:62:A8:95:4B:13:03:5A:D3:C4:63:45:6E:9C:F1:1C:E4:65||Jan 18, 2038|
|Corda Network Authority CNA1||ECC-256, SHA-256||A9:85:9F:69:4A:BF:06:00:3F:92:39:8B:D6:91:E4:AA:D0:02:ED:F5||Jan 18, 2038|
|Corda Network Authority CNA2||ECC-256, SHA-256||DC:22:4B:27:06:12:C1:23:E1:34:B1:64:22:95:17:09:22:E4:B9:A4||Jan 18, 2038|
|Corda Network Authority CNA3||ECC-256, SHA-256||EB:3F:58:3C:DA:0A:40:6F:F8:6E:49:9A:22:3F:8C:19:D5:8F:A0:88||Jan 18, 2038|
|Corda Network Authority CNA4||ECC-256, SHA-256||78:1D:2D:23:54:A5:8E:7A:B5:ED:A1:FE:08:D0:8B:4E:F0:D6:8B:CE||Jan 18, 2038|
|Corda Network Authority CNA5||ECC-256, SHA-256||7E:B3:9D:A4:D9:ED:F4:B4:86:06:79:6B:FE:F8:2A:7B:9C:C9:0E:97||Jan 18, 2038|
|Corda Network Authority CNA6||ECC-256, SHA-256||2A:F4:08:90:73:CB:4F:14:B2:93:7A:CB:93:5A:6F:91:45:45:27:EB||Jan 18, 2038|
|Corda Network Authority CNA7||ECC-256, SHA-256||82:40:F4:0E:A3:84:24:5C:70:23:40:2F:EE:26:32:6D:AA:0E:C4:BE||Jan 18, 2038|
|Corda Network Authority CNA8||ECC-256, SHA-256||41:67:90:E4:B2:EA:D8:E9:B5:39:51:91:31:8C:D5:3C:C9:67:A0:3B||Jan 18, 2038|
Service Auditor’s summary letter
Letter from the service auditor, Schellman and Company, LLC.
The original version of the script is a blank copy of the script used during the day. The internal witnesses annotated script records witness signatures, timings and deviations from the script and other observations.
This is the Original Script.
This is the Internal Witnesses’ annotated script.
HSM initialisation script
The root and subordinate HSMs were initialized the night before the ceremony. The process was overseen and witnessed by the Ceremony Administrator. See the CA annotated HSM initialisation script.
Extensive video recordings were made of the ceremony. The originals are not uploaded here, due to a combination of size and format constraints. Versions rendered to a manageable size have been uploaded to YouTube. The links below will take you there.
The playlist for Camera 1 shows a view of the participants in the ceremony.
The playlist for Camera 2 shows a view of the entire room from behind the ceremony witness seating area.
The Cameras were set to record at 1080p, however the output does not appear to reflect this. Each 20 minute segment is approximately 500MB.
Video Capture shows the output from the HSM administration machine that used by the Ceremony Administrator to interact with the HSMs during the ceremony. These appear to occupy approximately 724 MB per hour of recorded video at 720p.
HSM management computer screen log
The output from the HSM management machine was captured using the ‘script’ utility. There are two copies of the log file:
See the original log complete with control characters. There is a SHA fingerprint available for for this file (e66a4c79e2ba4a9a12ee7ea7d28af14d1842d6f18ce203da445b194ce80df097). A processed version of the log is available (which does not have a fingerprint available, but which is easier to read, as it does not have embedded control characters).
Logs from HSMs and SHA256 fingerprints for the same, calculated on the HMS management computer at the time they were exported.